Block ciphers are in widespread use since the 1970s. Their iterated structure is prone to numerous round invariant attacks for example in Linear Cryptanalysis (LC). The next step is to look at non-linear polynomial invariants cf. Eurocrypt'95. Until recently, researchers have found extremely few such attacks, with some impossibility results [4, 37, 7] . Eventually recent papers show how to construct polynomial invariant attacks for block ciphers, however many such results were of degree 2, cf. [10, 36, 8] . In this paper we propose a new incremental methodology for constructing high degree polynomial invariant attacks on block ciphers. A trivial attack on one cipher setup will be transposed to show the existence of a more advanced attack on a stronger cipher in several steps. The key tool is the manipulation of the roots of the so called Fundamental Equation. Examples are constructed with an old historical block cipher T-310.
Introduction, Non-Linear Cryptanalysis
The concept of cryptanalysis with non-linear polynomials a.k.a. Generalized Linear Cryptanalysis (GLC) was introduced at Eurocrypt'95, cf. [23] . A key question is the existence of round-invariant I/O sums: when a value of a certain polynomial is preserved after 1 round. Such properties are notoriously hard to find [36, 8] . There are 2 2 n possible invariants and systematic exploration is not feasible [4, 5, 25, 37] . In this paper and unlike in [36] we focus on invariants which work for 100 % of the keys and we focus on stronger invariants which hold with probability 1 for one round. In addition we look at an expensive historical and government cipher where encryption is substantially more costly than in modern ciphers such as 3DES, AES, cf. [16] . The number of rounds used to encrypt each character is simply very large and most standard cryptanalytic attacks will simply do not work, or will be very far from being practically relevant. However all this complexity is not that useful if we can discover invariant attacks working for any number of rounds.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the philosophy of the attacks and relation to mathematical theories of invariants and group theory. In Section 3 we introduce the question on polynomial invariants on ciphers and some useful notations. In Section 4 we look at the question of Feistel ciphers vs. general block ciphers. In Section 5 we provide the specification of our block cipher T-310. In Section 6 we explain that the problem of finding a one-round invariant can be formalized as the problem of solving the so called Fundamental Equation (FE). In Section 7 we show several examples of polynomial invariant attacks, some of which are simple linear attacks. We show how a linear invariant L on one cipher may hide the existence of another non-linear invariant property P on the same cipher. We do not stop here: in Section 7.3 we show that an invariant of degree 4 also exists, and in further sections the simpler invariants will be removed and we keep ONLY one invariant of degree 4. Then in Section 7.4 we modify the wiring in order to accommodate a more complex Boolean function. Then in Section 8 we show that two similar invariants may exist in one single cipher setup. Finally in Section 9 we will remove all invariants of degree 4 and we will be left with a one single invariant of degree 8. In few steps a pathologically weak cipher becomes a substantially stronger cipher and the attack becomes less obvious and harder to discover. In Section 10 and in Conclusion section we explain what was achieved so far and present some open problems.
Polynomial Invariant Attacks

Invariant Attacks, Partitioning Cryptanalysis, Linear Subspace Attacks
A general approach in cryptanalysis considers arbitrary subsets of binary vector spaces. This is called Partitioning Cryptanalysis (PC), cf. [3, 24] . Our work is then a special case: we study only partitions defined by the value (0/1) for a single Boolean polynomial, cf. [8] . This is less general but properties are more intelligible and follow clear rules of formal algebra. A serious theory is nowadays being developed around what is possible or not to achieve in partitioning and invariant attacks, cf. [4, 37, 7] .
In recent research there exist two major types of invariant attacks: linear sub-space invariants [26, 27, 4, 7] , and proper non-linear polynomial invariants [36, 8] , which are somewhat more general. In many cases (but not always) two types of attacks are the same: an attack where the invariant is a product of simple linear polynomials A, B,C, D, for example P = ABCD in Section 7.3, is also simultaneously a linear subspace attack. However the most general attack is an attack with a sum of products, for example P = AC + BD in Section 7.2 and it is irreducible so it cannot be expressed as a single product, and therefore it is not an attack with a linear sub-space invariant [3, 4, 37, 6] . This demonstrates that the product attack is NOT necessarily the most powerful attack. In general we work in polynomial rings and both addition and multiplication are allowed and the polynomial P = AC + BD in Section 7.2 was verified to be irreducible.
Invariants vs. Mathematical Theory of [Polynomial] Invariants
A key observation is that a set of all possible invariants for any block cipher is in general a ring: a sum of two invariants is an invariant. Likewise, a product of two invariants gives also another invariant. We have a potentially rich mathematical structure, a ring. However in many cases this ring seems 1 to have only a small number of elements. One of the reasons for this is that when we multiply various Boolean functions frequently we get zero (annihilation) or one of the operands (absorption). This also means that it makes a lot of sense to study these rings as partially ordered set (or POSETs) with the partial order defined by the usual division of (Boolean) polynomials. A standard method to represent POSETs are Hasse diagrams, cf. There exists an extensive theory of multivariate polynomial algebraic invariants [22] which historically, in mathematics, has studied mostly invariants w.r.t. linear transformations and has rarely studied invariants with more than 5 variables and in finite fields of small size. In our work we study invariants w.r.t non-linear transformations and 36 or more variables over GF (2) . More ample explanations on how the present work is simultaneously very closely related and yet differs very substantially from questions typically studied by mathematicians in the classical [Hilbertian] invariant theory can be found in Section 2.4 in [18] . We summarize the main comparison points here. In classical work in maths we have: 1) invariants are polynomials of small degree, 2) they have only 2 sometimes up to 5 variables, 3) polynomials are over large fields and rings, frequently algebraically closed or infinite (or both), or in fields with large characteristic, 4) invariants should not change when we operate a LINEAR input variable transformation L, a very important limitation, 3+4 makes that there is a scaling scalar or factor σ in most invariants known in classical mathematics: a determinant of the linear transformation L, 5) these invariants are in general multivariate polynomials. The common points with our work on block ciphers are (1) and (5) and there are very substantial differences as follows: 2') we work with many more variables for P, typically between 8 and 36 at a time. 3') we work with GF(2) mainly, which seems to be the best choice, 4') we work with invariants which remain the same after applying an extremely complex non-linear transformation sometimes called φ , or any power of it φ k with extra variables which are secret (such as key bits) or public (such as round constants or IV bits). 3+4 Here the scaling factor δ could only be equal to 1 and should be omitted.
A Group Theoretic Interpretation
The question of invariants is very closely related and also to the study of the groups generated by various cipher transformations This question was studied for a long time, since early 1970 in both Eastern Bloc [31, 32, 33] and in the West, [34, 2, 11, 12] .
Fig. 2.1 Interpretation of our work in terms of walks in group lattices
It is very difficult to know the actual size of a group generated by cryptographic transformations except that cipher designers have worked very hard for decades on how to make it extremely large and extremely complex. What is however accessible to us is to see that certain groups are smaller because each transformation satisfies a certain invariant. In general different groups generated by different versions of a cipher will be ordered by inclusion and we get a partially ordered set of groups.
More generally these groups can be embedded in a larger lattice of groups which do not need to correspond to a particular version of a cipher, but also characterised by additional (technical) conditions. Then the whole incremental approach of invariant hopping which we study in this paper can be interpreted as walks in group lattices. This is illustrated on Fig. 2.1 .
In this paper we will not study this approach in detail. An open problem is to revisit known result on groups generated by block cipher transformations and at the same time compute the full invariant ring for each group. This is quite difficult because currently no efficient method for computing the full invariant ring is known.
Finding Advanced Invariant Attacks
The primary method proposed in 2018 is through solving the so called Fundamental Equation or FE cf. [8] . Solving such equation(s), or several such equations simultaneously, guarantees that we obtain a Boolean function for our cipher and the polynomial invariant P which propagates for any number of rounds. However nothing guarantees that the FE equation has any solutions whatsoever. In this paper we construct polynomial invariants explicitly by modifying something which worked. A trivial attack on a weak cipher will be transformed into a better or higher degree invariant attack on a stronger cipher in several steps. We call this method "invariant hopping" illustrated in Fig 
The Question of Weak Keys and Backdoors
There are numerous constructions of weak ciphers in cryptographic literature, cf. for example work related to the AES S-box [11, 12] , and [3, 7] including work on choice of constants in modern hash functions [1, 28] which are also based on block ciphers. In this paper, a weak key or rather a weak long-term key setup is primarily a tool to find some attack more easily, and the same attack may be transposed to hold also for another (stronger) cipher setup. In terms of backdoors an interesting question is how many entries in the truth table of an arbitrary Boolean function need to be altered in order to make a given polynomial invariant attack work. Recent work suggests that is some cases this number can be quite low, cf. [9] . This is also what we will demonstrate in Section 9.
Polynomial Invariants and Block Ciphers
We call P a polynomial invariant if the value of P is preserved after one round of encryption, i.e. if P(Inputs) = P(Outputs).
Another notation is to write that P = P φ where P φ denotes how our polynomial is transformed by our block cipher, where one round of our block cipher is denoted by φ (), and and we will later define
where • is the composition of functions which by convention is applied (in order) from right to left. However this notation is somewhat ambiguous. On one side it is possible that it is not well defined because one round of encryption φ depends on some extra parameters such as key or IV bits. On the other side, the polynomial P is frequently very carefully chosen by the attacker so that this would not be the case and numerous variables are already eliminated.
This works for any block cipher except that such attacks are notoriously hard to find [4] in the last 20 years since [23] . In this paper we are going to work with one specific block cipher with 36-bit 2 blocks. The main point is that any block cipher round translates into relatively simple Boolean polynomials, if we look at just one round. We follow the methodology of [8] in order to specify the exact mathematical constraint, known as the Fundamental Equation or FE, so that we could have a polynomial invariant attack on our cipher. Such an attack will propagate for any number of rounds (if independent of key and other bits). In addition it makes sense following [8] to consider that the Boolean function inside the cipher is an unknown. We denote this function by a special variable Z. We then see that our attack works if and only if Z is a solution to a certain algebraic equation [with additional variables]. The main interest of making Z a variable is to find some strong attacks in the cases where the Boolean function is extremely weak case, (e.g. Z is linear) and transpose them to stronger ciphers where Z will be increasingly complex. We discard the attacks when the FE reduces to 0 a nd which work for any Z. It appears that such attacks are quite rare cf. [8] and our later specific trick or method for finding new attacks by manipulating the roots of FE would not work.
Notation and Methodology
In this paper the sign + denotes addition modulo 2, and frequently we omit the sign * in products. For the sake of compact notation we frequently use short or single letter variable names. For example let x 1 , . . . , x 36 be inputs of a block cipher each being ∈ {0, 1}. We will avoid this notation and name them with small letters a−z and letters M − V when we run out of lowercase letters. We follow the backwards numbering convention of [8] with a = x 36 till z = x 11 and then we use specific capital letters M = x 10 till V = x 1 . This avoids some "special" capital letters following notations used since the 1970s [16, 35, 31] . We consider that each round of encryption is identical except that they can differ only in some "public" bits called F (and known to the attacker) and some "secret" bits called K also known as S 1 , or L also known as S 2 . Even though these bits ARE different in different rounds we will omit to specify in which round we take them because our work is about constructing one round invariants (extending to any number of rounds). This framework covers most block ciphers ever made except that some ciphers would have more "secret" or "public" bits in one round. The capital letter Z is a placeholder for substitution of the following kind Z(e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 , e 5 , e 6 )
where e 1 . . . e 6 will be some 6 of the other variables. In practice, the e i will represent a specific subset of variables of type a-z, or other such as L. Later Z (and maybe another letter like W ) needs to be replaced by a formula like:
where Zi j are coefficients of the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF).
Polynomial Invariants
We are looking for arbitrary Boolean polynomial invariants. For example say
could be an invariant after 1 round. In this space some solutions are considered as trivial and are easy to find, for example when P is a simple product of linear invariants cf. Appendix of [8] . For this reason some early papers on this topic emphasised complex irreducible polynomials which were considered both less trivial and harder to discover. One of the main points in discovery of innovative attacks on block ciphers is that non-trivial attacks with irreducible polynomial invariants of degree higher than 2 are actually at all possible, and how to construct some (rather than just discover accidentally). In fact we do NOT and should not restrict our attention to irreducible polynomials. A fundamental point is that even when P is just a simple product of linear invariants, it is possible that the linear invariants will not work and only their product works. Or that we can subsequently remove the simpler invariants (!). Several examples of this are shown in this paper.
A Constructive Approach Given the Cipher Wiring
We consider an arbitrary block cipher 3 . Our attack methodology starts 4 from a given block cipher specified by its ANFs for one round. Specific examples are shown for T-310, an old Feistel cipher with 4 branches. This cipher offers great flexibility in the choice of the internal wiring so that we can possibly make some adjustments if we do not find a property we are looking for. Most block ciphers such as DES or AES also have this sort of flexibility in the choice of P-boxes, arbitrary invertible matrices inside the S-box, inside the mixing layers, etc. However there is only one such cipher (to the best of our knowledge) in which a high degree of flexibility in the choice of internal wiring is officially allowed, and was used to encrypt real-life communications. In original T-310 cipher machines the wiring of the cipher would be changed once per year [14] . Arbitrary changes in this wiring including some extremely weak ones [17] are possible, and will be entirely compatible with original historical hardware.
On Feistel Ciphers
The question of non-linear invariants in Feistel ciphers in particular was first studied by Knudsen and Robshaw at Eurocrypt'96 cf. [25] . The authors have actually claimed that this approach cannot or will not work for Feistel ciphers. This type of impossibility claim is, well simply fake news, or an incorrect interpretation of [25] . There is no doubt non-linear invariant attacks CAN be made to work for Feistel ciphers.
One type of attack was shown in a later paper presented at Crypto 2004. The concepts of Bi-Linear and Multi-Linear cryptanalysis were subsequently introduced [10, 11, 20] in order to work with Feistel ciphers with two and several branches specifically. There are however indeed some serious difficulties in making such attacks work. One of them is that great majority of attacks work only for a fraction of key space, which was already clearly visible in the work of [10] . In this paper and other recent work however we show that this difficulty can be overcome entirely for T-310 cipher: the attack will work for any key (!). For other ciphers such as DES, the problem remains, see for example Thm. 11.6 in [9] and Section 1.1 in [26] and Section 5.2. in [6] which seems to suggest that one cannot have an attack which would not make some assumption on the key. We believe indeed that for some ciphers we will maybe never find a really good attack in this respect however our results on T-310 in this paper and other in [8] suggests that one can be more optimistic: indeed different attack for different keys can overlap and the same polynomial invariant can be obtained in many different ways [factorization for Boolean polynomials is not unique cf. [18, 19] ].
Specification and Boolean Polynomial Representation of T-310
The block size is 36 bits and the key has 240 bits. We number the cipher state bits from 1 to 36. The bits 1, 5, 9 . . . 33 are those freshly created in one round, cf. Fig  5. 1. All the input bits with numbers which are NOT multiples of 4 are shifted by 1 position, i.e. bit 1 becomes 2 in the next round, and bit 35 becomes 36. We denote round inputs by x 1 , . . . , x 36 and the outputs will be y 1 , . . . , y 36 . One round of encryption can be described as 36 Boolean polynomials of degree 6, cf. In T-310 the specification of the internal wiring of the cipher is called an LZS or Langzeitschlüssel which means a long-term key. We simply need to specify two
For example D(5) = 36 will mean that input bit 36 is connected to the wire which becomes y 17 after XOR. Then P(1) = 25 will mean that input 25 is connected as the 2nd input of Z() also known as v1 in Fig. 5 .3. The equation (f1) means that we apply a special convention, where the key bit K is used instead of one of the D(i) by specifying that D(i) = 0.
, . . . , x P(12) ) (z2) In order for our polynomials to be short and compact we sometimes replace the 36 bits x 1 − x 36 by single letters, cf. Fig. 5.4 . We avoid certain letters like F used elsewhere.
We study polynomial invariants for one round with 36 variables. Therefore variables x i and y i are treated "alike" and can be called be the SAME letter, for example x 36 = a and then y 36 = a also. If we want to avoid ambiguity, we will distinguish between the variable a at input denoted by a i or just a, and the same variable at output denoted by a o or a φ where φ is a short notation for one round of encryption. When later in this paper we use some concrete LZS (for example LZS 551 which is specified later) this leads to replacing variables and to some simplifications, as shown in the example below. For example y 25 is l and if D(7) = 20 then x D (7) becomes q, etc, and we get l ← F + Z1 + O + q. This can be interpreted as one round of encryption is equivalent to replacing l and all the other letters by our exact formulas, for example with LZS 551 we get the following substitutions:
In order to break our cipher we need to find a polynomial expression P say P(a, b, c, d, e, f , g, h, . . .) = abcdi jkl + e f g + e f h + egh + f gh using any number between 1 and 36 variables such that if we substitute in P all the variables by the substitutions defined we would get exactly the same polynomial expression P, i.e. P(Inputs) = P(Output ANF) are equal as multivariate polynomials. We obtain: Definition 6.1 (Compact Uni/Quadri-variate FE) Our "Fundamental Equation (FE)" to solve is to make sure that sum of two polynomials like: FE = P(Inputs) + P(Output ANF) reduces to 0, or more precisely we are aiming at FE = 0 for any input, or in other words we want to achieve a formal equality of two Boolean polynomials like P(Inputs) + P(Transformed Outputs) = 0 or even more precisely
where Z1 − Z4 will be later replaced by Boolean functions Z(),Y (), X(),W (). Alternative Notation. There is also another notation which is more like notations used in classical invariant theory. Instead of writing FE = P(Inputs) + P(Transformed Outputs) we can also write:
= P(φ (Inputs)) = P(Transformed Outputs) which is the same as above, and we can also write: In other words they are written as formal polynomials in B 36 corresponding to the ANF expressions of one round of encryption (and as a function of inputs of this round). Our usage of exponents is similar as in the mathematical (Hilbertian) invariant theory. Our exponents can be simply interpreted as transformations on polynomials, or more precisely as operations belonging to a certain group of transformations acting on a set of Boolean polynomials P or A or other say (azM + b) ∈ B 36 where B 36 is the precise ring of all Boolean polynomials in 36 variables named a−z and M −V as in this paper. The notation P φ is very elegant and unhappily ambiguous or not always well-defined. This is because in general φ depends also on F and various key bits. Then it happens that P φ is likely to be unique nevertheless: we are aiming at computing P φ primarily and precisely in cases where the result, the transformed and substituted polynomial P φ is such that the final result P φ does NOT depend on the variables F, K, L (!). This may and will become possible when our polynomial P is particularly well chosen.
In the next step, Z will be represented by an Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) with 64 binary variables which are the coefficients of the ANF of Z, and there will be several equations, and four instances Z,Y, X,W of the same Z: Definition 6.2 (A Multivariate FE) At this step we will rewrite FE as follows. We will replace Z1 by:
Z ← Z00 + Z01 * L + Z02 * j + Z03 * L j + . . . + Z62 * jh f pd + Z63 * L jh f pd Likewise we will also replace Z2: Y ← Z00 + Z01 * k + Z02 * l + Z03 * kl + . . . + Z62 * loent + Z63 * kloent and likewise for X = Z3 and W = Z4 and the coefficients Z00 . . . Z63 will be the same inside Z1 − Z4, however the subsets of 6 variables chosen out of 36 will be different in Z1 − Z4. Moreover, some coefficients of P may also be variable.
In all cases, all we need to do is to solve our FE equation for Z, i.e. determine 64 binary variables Z00 . . . Z63. This formal algebraic approach, if it has a solution, still called Z for simplicity, or (P, Z) will guarantee that our invariant P holds for 1 round. This is, and in this paper we are quite lucky, IF this equation does not depend on three bits F, K, L. This is the discovery process of [8] .
In this paper we do NOT use this process. We will work by attack hopping. From one attack we will derive the existence of another attack on a different cipher wiring (i.e. a different LZS). Thus we completely avoid all the most difficult questions in [8] : Do such equations have any solutions? If they have, can the solution be the same for several permutations simultaneously so that our attack can work in presence of key bits, round constants, IV bits etc? We concentrate on transposing some working attacks to another cipher setup or where the Boolean function is modified. No systematic method to study all possible invariant attacks is known and possibly such method does not exist due to double-exponential explosion in the number of possible polynomial invariants.
KT1 Keys and Higher Degree Invariant Attacks
Many polynomial invariants on block ciphers published so far are of low degree, mainly of degree 2 [10, 8, 36] and finding any such invariants was quite difficult. Many examples presented are also quite artificial because they have little to do with any encryption systems used to encrypt real-life communications. The East German government cryptologist have mandated that for an LZS to be approved for "official" use, it must satisfy a certain very complex specification called KT1 which takes one full page to describe, cf. Appendix B in [14] . Therefore we expect that it is substantially harder to find an attack on a KT1 key. Our starting point will be some simple invariants from [8] which actually work for a genuine KT1 key, something considered very hard to do until recently. There are approximately 2 83 possible KT1 keys, cf. Section 5.4. of [17] while there are approximately 2 170 possible 5 LZS keys. The reader can therefore imagine that the attacks we present here for KT1 keys are substantially harder to find than most of earlier attacks on T-310 such as found in [8] : numerous technical constraints must be satisfied simultaneously.
It is known that about 3 % of KT1 keys can are extremely weak w.r.t. Linear Cryptanalysis, cf. [15] . Inside the remaining 97 % of cases, can a KT1 key be vulnerable to a non-linear invariant attack? The answer is that in some cases yes, as we are going to show later. and one solution which makes our cipher weak is Z = 1 + d + e + f + de + cde + de f . The fact that our FE contains none of F, K, L implies that our polynomial P is an invariant which works for any key and any IV and for any number of rounds.
Starting Point: A Peculiar Quadratic Attack on a KT1 Key
It may seems that (Y + m)(g + o) = 0 was obtained by some sort of accident, later we will see why this attack works, cf. later Thm. 7.3 and Fig. 7.1 . Before that we need to make a number of observations. We abstract our FE from notations used for the whole cipher, and look at the inputs of our Boolean function. Then our FE can be re-written as the following "annihilation requirement" using Z + f , where f is an input of Z, and Z + f must be annihilated by a linear term d + e, and d, e are also inputs of Z:
(Z + f )(d + e) = 0 5 A quick estimation is 36 27 · 27! · 36 9 · 9! · 36 ≈ 2 170 .
An Essential Insight
It is easy to see that P is irreducible and no linear attack exists for this cipher setup. Interestingly we have P = AC + BD where: If we go back to a non-linear Boolean functions, inside D → C → B → A → D we have 3 trivial transitions which are always true and one "impossible" transition A → D which is no longer correct (unless Y is equal to its last input).
Eliminating the Output of Boolean Function Y
Interestingly, on Fig. 7.1 we "almost" have A → D transition, the difference A i + D o is actually equal to the output of Boolean function Z2 which is also denoted as Y plus an affine function. This is due to internal wiring in LZS 551 and can be checked either by applying equations of one round in Section 5, or much more easily by simply summing bits on a path going from in output 21 to 29 through bits numbered D(6), D(8), P(6) and the output Y precisely in Fig. 7.2 . Here bits D(8), P(6) cancel, D(6) connects to input bit 32, and bit 32 goes to 6-th input f of Y (). Now in some sense in our attacks we are allowed to consider that Y + f behaves as it was zero. More precisely, we are going to see that Y + f and later Y + e can be annihilated in different ways, more or less trivial in different attacks inside this paper. We will first revisit our attack P = AC + BD and show why and when it works.
Looking at Fig. 7.1 we are now able to abstract the attack on key 551 which was first discovered in [8] and we can propose a more general result and attack. Our attack corresponds to a sum of products of all polynomials lying on two disjoint sub-cycles of length 2 which form a partitioning of the whole cycle.
A More General Result Beyond LZS 551
An important insight is that in order for AC + BD to be invariant we need to show that:
and due 6 to the structure of our cycle we always have one transition which is trivial:
therefore it remains to show that for any input for 1 round we have:
moreover we have another trivial property C i = B o and our equation boils down to:
This is and will be achieved in our [previous and generalized] attack using two neatly distinct assumptions. First we are going to make sure through the cipher wiring that we have the transition with addition of Y + f or similar as depicted on the left hand side of Fig. 7.1 , we aim at having: (D o + A i ) = Y (its 6 inputs) + (some linear combination of these 6 inputs)
Then we are going to make sure that this affine modification of our Boolean function Y + f or similar will be annihilated by polynomial C i . More precisely we show that: Theorem 7.3 (KT1 compatible invariant) For each long term key s.t. D(8) = P(6), D(6) = 32 and P(10) = 30, P(11) = 22 and P(12) = 24, if the Boolean function is such that (Z + f )(d +e) = 0 and for any short term key on 240 bits, and for any initial state on 36 bits, we have the non-linear invariant P = AC + BD true with probability 1.0 for any number of rounds.
Proof: We first show how (D o + A i ) can be equal to a sum of Y () and some of its inputs. We XOR two equations (r2) and (r4) from the formulas of Fig. 5.2 in Section 5 which specify our cipher:
then we have D(8) = P(6) and two terms cancel and we get: (6) and we check that D(6) = 32 and therefore we have:
which knowing that A i = x 24 + x 32 becomes in turn
where x 24 is the same as last input f for this Boolean function, due to P(12) = 24. The same result can be obtained following the path going from in output 21 to 29 through bits numbered D(6), D(8), P(6) and the output Y in Fig. 7. 2. Finally we also check that (Y + x 24 )C i = 0 is the same as (Z + f )(d + e) = 0 due to C i = x 30 + x 22 and P(10) = 30, P(11) = 22 and P(12) = 24. Fig. 7.2 The internal structure of one round of T-310 block cipher.
Downgrading Our Invariant:
Now we show that our non-linear attack hides the existence of a yet simpler attack with a degenerated Boolean function. To shows this we observe that input f of Y is P [12] = m, i.e. last input of Z2 is precisely connected to m with LZS 551. What happens if Y = m i.e. Z = f ? We have another degenerated solution of our FE being (Y + m)(g + o) = 0 and we have in fact found a root for a proper factor (Y − m) = 0 of our previous FE. Next
Step. An interesting question is can we do this in a reverse direction? Find a cipher setup where the FE is a multiple of (Y − m)(g + o) = 0 ? Yes!
Construction of Higher Degree Invariants
Such invariants if they exist are NOT uniquely determined, they may depend on the choice of the Boolean function Z in the previous step (!). For the current pair LZS, Z as above we found that the following P of degree 4 also works: where in fact P = ABCD. Interestingly, no other invariants being polynomials in A, B,C, D exist. We conjecture however that no invariants other than AC + BD (irreducible) and ABCD (not irreducible) exist for 1 round 7 and probably not in general 8 . For sure we have verified that no linear invariants exist here for LZS 551 and Z = 1 + d + e + f + de + cde + de f . This decomposition implies that any solution Z which is a solution to the previous FE will also work here but NOT vice versa. 7 For 2 rounds we have closely related invariants AC → BD → AC with AC and BD being invariants for 4 rounds. All these do not use F, K, L either. 8 In fact it is hard to be sure, no method to explore all possible invariants with 36 variables at higher degrees is known and possibly such method does not exist
A More Autonomous Example of An Invariant of Degree 4
Until now we have seen that a weak cipher with linear invariants A, B,C, D shared the same non-linear invariants with a cipher where the only attacks are the nonlinear ones AC + BD and ABCD. Is it possible to remove the first attack and keep the second? Yes and it is requires minimal change. We recall that AC + BD will be an invariant each time our Boolean function satisfies:
and in order for ABCD to be an invariant, Z needed to satisfy:
All we have to do now is to find a solution Y which satisfies one FE and not the other FE! For example we can find a solution to an alternative equation:
which is different than the most trivial solution Y (......) = m and which then will satisfy only the first equation mDCB = Y DCB. One example of such solution is Y = 1 + n + nm + f + m f using the same variable names. A better solution is to modify LZS 551 very slightly: we just need to make sure that letters f and n are actually inputs of Y . Only two modifications are needed. Here is a solution found by a SAT solver:
558: P=17, 4,33,12,10,8,23,24,31,25,16,10,20,2,21,34, 1,25,13,28,14,16,36,29,32,23,27 D=0,12,4,36,16,32,20,8,24 Z(a,b,c,d,e,f)=1+a+ab+c+bc
We have checked that no other invariants at degree up to 3 exist with all the 36 state variables for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . and various numbers of rounds. All simple invariants were removed with the new Boolean function and only ABCD is left.
A Yet Stronger Example
One step further, we try to find a non-trivial (proper) solution to: mBC = Y BC Here we will need to use as inputs of Z all the 5 variables which appear in this equation. A nice trick to quickly find a solution which is a "proper" root of (m+Y )BC is to first create a new equation FE which implies the previous one by multiplying both sides by B, yet at the same time FE actually imposes the presence of the two variables f , n in B, and another 6 − th variable, for example:
Again just one invariant ABCD remains after changing the Boolean function but now our Boolean function must use 6 quite specific variables which must be connected to inputs of Z2 = Y . One possible solution is as follows: 550: P=17, 4,33,12,10,8,22,23,24,31,30,20,20,2,21,34, 1,25,13,28,14,16,36,29,32,23,27 D=0,12,4,36,16,32,20,8,24 Z(a,b,c,d,e,f)=1+b+c+d+aef+abef
A Transposed Attack with Two Cycles
We want to further modify this attack in order to make it stronger. We consider a method (found with help of our research assistant Matteo Abbondati) to imitate or transpose the current attack by designing two independent cycles of length 4 based on the same principle as on Fig. 7.1 . We would like two such cycles to exist simultaneously for the same cipher wiring. We define: Here one example of LZS constructed to satisfy the conditions of Fig. 8.1 is: 19,33,7,10,3,18,26,17,30,4,25,28,2,21,34,1,11, 15,8,14,6,13,29,12,5,27 D=24,16,36,12,20,32,4,8,28 Here the inputs of W are in order 18, 26, 17, 30, 4, 25 and inputs of Y are in order 14, 6, 13, 29, 12, 5 A quick computation shows that the Fundamental Equation for P = ABCD is exactly equal to: From here it is easy to see that we can make both equations vanish simultaneously if we have: 16 , cf. Thm C.2 in Appendix C in [9] or Section 5 in [19] . In this attack, it easy to see that in addition to two invariants of degree 4, an invariant of degree 8 also exists. More precisely, a product of two invariants for a block cipher is always an invariant. Therefore P = ABCDEFGH is also an invariant with LZS 443 and any Boolean function which satisfied our FE equation as above.
9 Removing Lower-degree Invariants and Increasing the Degree in Our Annihilation Requirement
We have further modified the LZS and the Boolean function so that invariants of degree 4 disappear and only one invariant of degree 8 remains.
P = ABCDEFGH
this is achieved for a modified cipher wiring as follows:
444: P=17,1,33,2,10, 3,18,26,19,27,36,5,16,32,21,34,8, 25,13,28,14,6,15,7,12,23,30 D=24,20,4,12,8,32,36,16,28 where the inputs of W are in order 18, 26, 19, 27, 36, 5 and inputs of Y are in order 14, 6, 15, 7, 12, 23 The main principle is that we disconnect the two cycles in Fig. 8.1 and connect them to make one single cycle. This is done by literally exchanging the two values of D(5), P(13) with D(2), P (20) which has the effect to combine the two cycles, cf. Fig. 9.1 . The constraints D(7) = P(11) and D(4) = P(25) remain unchanged. Then we verify that the new wiring gives a bijective round function (which is not obvious). We have then:
Now we have only input-side variables and we can drop the i notations:
which can be rewritten as:
We will now discard factors such as D which have variables not used as inputs of our Boolean functions W,Y . In contrast knowing that inputs of W are 18, 26, 19, 27, 36, 5 the polynomials B,C are legitimate potential annihilating factors for W . Similarly, the inputs of Y are 14, 6, 15, 7, 12, 23 and F, G can be used. It is then easy to see that one way to annihilate the FE equation above is to have simultaneously:
which also will insure the annihilation of our third term with BCFG(W + e)(Y + e) = 0. Knowing that these Boolean function are identical We obtain two identical annihilation requirements being exactly: Remark. The same invariant attack with LZS 444 also appears inside [21] . This paper and [21] can be seen as two radically different ways to eventually obtain the same attack. We believe that the fact that the same attack can be obtained in a many different ways is very interesting. It is not a bug but rather an feature. The possibility to obtain the same attack in many distinct ways already occurs inside the framework of [21] where we multiply different polynomials (and factorisation is not unique).
Results Achieved and Discussion
Very few non-linear attacks are known and working examples are valuable. An invariant attack of degree 8 is potentially extremely hard to find or detect, therefore we achieve a stronger attack than before. It is also substantially stronger in terms of the manipulation of the Boolean function required to make this attack work. It is easy to see we are closer to an attack which could work for an arbitrary Boolean function. In order for the attack above to work, all which we need to do is to make sure that Z = e in 2 4 cases out of 2 6 . These 2 4 cases correspond to the truth table entries for Z such that (a + b)(c + d) = 1. All the other 2 6 − 2 4 truth table entries can be arbitrary 9 .
This shows that a block cipher setup such as LZS 444 can be backdoored by manipulating only a fraction of entries in a truth table of Z. A recent paper shows that with another invariant of degree 8 and another LZS wiring this fraction can be yet smaller, cf. [9] .
Open Problems
There is still a long way to go in order to actually break T-310. For KT1 keys we designed an attack of degree 4, however the Boolean function is quite weak. then we presented an attack of degree 8 under assumption that (Z +e)(a+b)(c+d) = 0 which works for stronger Boolean functions however the long-term key is no longer KT1. In order to break our cipher with the original Boolean function we need rather an attack which would work with annihilators with 3 linear factors like Z(a+b)c(1+e) = 0, cf. [14] . An example of such an attack can be found in [9] however then again the LZS wiring is not KT1. Moreover it is possible to see that current attack constructions (here and in [9] ) lead to attacks where the annihilating factors involve 2 variables such as (a + b) which eliminate F, and it is more difficult to construct attacks with annihilating factors such as c(1 + e). It appears that T-310 disposes of a good security margin and only weaker cipher setups can currently be attacked. Or we need to find better attacks.
The Question of Key Bits
There exist numerous interesting vulnerabilities in T-310. For example, the key splits in two parts which are used in a completely different way, and many other potentially serious vulnerabilities, some of which are listed in Section 28.2 of [14] . In non-linear invariant attacks it iq quite interesting to see that almost all attacks studied so far do not involve any key bits, with very few exceptions (cf. Section 9.1 in [8] We have simply not yet studied the full spectrum of attacks and attacks which involve key bits could be very useful, cf. last sub-section in [15] ) and Section 4.11 in [8] . In relation to this question, one anonymous referee for this paper have written the following words:
[...] when we look carefully at the conditions, it appears that the first boolean function Z only takes 5 variables [...] and specifically one bit of the secret key. Meaning that the secret key only intervenes in a LINEAR way between the first round and the second round, I believe other very powerful attacks will appear. [...]
It is an open problem how this property could be exploited in cryptanalysis of T-310. We should not ignore the fact that the same key bit L is also used again, just before Z3, cf. Fig. 7.2 . However any variable can potentially be eliminated in an invariant attack.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates a novel invariant hopping technique. An attack on a pathologically weak cipher setup (with a linear Boolean function!) is transposed to break another stronger cipher. In several steps we remove the trivial attacks and keep less trivial ones. The complexity and algebraic degree for the invariant and the Boolean function, and the number of variables needed increase progressively. At the end we obtain an invariant of degree 9 and no invariant of lower degree.
We also show that when the degree of the invariant grows, in order to make such attacks work one needs to manipulate only a small fraction of the entries of the truth table of the Boolean function. This means there exist invariant attacks which are highly compatible with most known security and non-linearity criteria on Boolean functions [30] . In other words, the attack presented in this paper is not prevented by the traditional methodology used in block cipher design and analysis. This in turn means that we need more work on anti-invariant resistance in block ciphers cf. [4, 37, 7] . Extremely few attacks in symmetric cryptanalysis ever invented work when the number of rounds is very large.
